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The Arab Spring: A Revolution for
Egyptian Emigration?
Le « printemps arabe » : une révolution pour l’émigration égyptienne ?
La « primavera árabe » : ¿una revolución para la emigración egipcia?
Delphine Pagès-El Karoui
“Me, I got out of there, I left Egypt partly for the same
reasons that caused the revolution […] It was for social
justice, I felt like we weren’t free in Egypt, that there
are things we can’t say, can’t do.” Hussain, Paris, 15
Feb 2013 (cited in Ricci, 2013: 86).
1 In Egypt,  emigration and revolution have structurally similar causes.  The economic
(unemployment,  underemployment,  low  wages,  etc),  political  (authoritarianism,
corruption,  clientelism,  etc)  and  social  (socio-spatial  inequalities,  patriarchy,  high
marriage costs, etc) dysfunctions that are among the main reasons for emigrating are,
at the same time, the elements that sparked the 25 January 2011 revolution (Pagès-El
Karoui  and  Vignal,  2011).  Large-scale  emigration  has  been encouraged by  Egyptian
public authorities since the 1970s, particularly for those with higher education. It has
been a  way of  escaping the country’s  dysfunctions,  but  also a  means for  exporting
latent  contestation  and  reinforcing  structures  of  authoritarian  domination,  by
preventing  the  renewal  of  elites  (Bel-Air,  2014).  It  has  also  contributed  to  the
transformations of Egyptian society (individualisation, the growth of consumer society,
openness  to  the  rest  of  the  world,  etc)  that  made  a  popular  uprising  against  the
authoritarian  regime  and  the  fall  of  president  Mubarak  possible  (Pagès-El  Karoui,
2012a). Has Egyptian emigration augmented or otherwise been altered as a result of the
unsettling of public order in Egypt and the region?1
2 2011 is undeniably a key date in the history of the Arab world. Can the same be said of
it  with  respect  to  Egyptian  migrations?2 Did  the  year  2011  bring  to  a  close  the
migratory cycle begun in 1990 with the Gulf war, which caused numerous Egyptians to
return  from  Iraq  and  the  oil-rich  countries  of  the  Arabian  Peninsula?  This  article
examines how Egyptian emigration has been affected by the political, economic and
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geopolitical turbulences connected to the Arab revolutions. It focuses on two angles.
First, have the political and geopolitical changes initiated since 2011 created any major
shifts either in terms of the scale or destination countries of emigration flows from
Egypt?  The  revolutionary  period  considerably  modified  the  migratory  imaginary
prevalent among the Egyptians who choose to leave Egypt or remain living abroad, as
well as in destination countries. The re-founding of the national narrative—or national
imaginary,  following  Benedict  Anderson’s  (2006)  work—crystallized  around  Tahrir
Square.  During  the  18  days  that  preceded  Mubarak’s  fall,  Egyptians  imagined  the
possibility of a new Egypt, rid of its divisions and dysfunctions, more democratic and
egalitarian,  in  which  they  might  build  a  future  without  having  to  expatriate
themselves.
3 The Egyptian case well illustrates the extreme volatility of the revolutionary situation,
which is accompanied by brutal changes and reversals. Taking into account different
temporalities is therefore necessary to gain a good grasp of the processes. During the
transition  period  managed  by  the  military,  once  the  common  enemy  (Mubarak)
disappeared, the intense feeling of national unity experienced during the 18 days (25
January  –  11  February  2011)  rather  quickly  collapsed.  The  national  narrative
subsequently took on a more Islamist and less democratic hue during the presidency of
the Muslim Brotherhood candidate, Mohamed Morsi (June 2012-July 2013). Finally, the
army’s return to power, following huge public discontent, confirmed by the subsequent
election of General Sisi as president in June 2014, has adjourned the political transition
for  a  time.  The  shockwaves  of  these  successive  reversals  propagated  themselves
through the Egyptian diasporas.
4 This leads to the article’s second question: how did Egyptians living abroad experience
these historic events? The argument made here is that during an initial period, the
revolutionary  process  intensified  emigrants’  transnational  practices  and  perhaps
briefly initiated a process of ‘diasporization,’ that is, the construction of a feeling of
belonging to an Egyptian diaspora, a national collective outside the country’s territory
and going beyond its multiple divisions. This feeling disappeared quickly, in a manner
that echoes the divisions emerging inside Egypt. Each of these four periods generated
different impacts on the flows and transnational connections of Egyptian migrants.
 
What were the Impacts of the Arab Revolutions on
Migratory Flows of Egyptians?
5 This section examines how the postrevolutionary context affected return by Egyptians
living abroad, while at the same time causing new departures. Migratory policy was
transformed more in countries that employ Egyptian workers than in Egypt itself.
 
Voluntary, Forced, and Deferred Returns
6 Quantifying  the  effects  of  the  Arab  revolutions  on  Egyptian  migratory  flows  is
challenging  when  already  we  have  a  hard  time  even  estimating  the  number  of
Egyptians living abroad: estimates vary between 2 and 8 million people (Abdelfattah,
2011; Fargues and Fandrich, 2012; Zohry, 2013). It is even more difficult to estimate how
many may have returned since 2011, since returns are by definition harder to quantify.
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Voluntary (and often Temporary) Returns of Qualified Migrants
7 Buoyed by the great hope of rapid change, many migrants, especially qualified ones,
left  their  lives abroad behind in order to participate in the revolution,  then in the
country’s  reconstruction  (Premazzi,  Ambrosetti,  Cela  and  Fokkema,  2013).  Wael
Ghunim (2012), the administrator of the We Are All Khaled Said Facebook group,3 left his
job in Dubai as a regional marketing director for Google in order to participate in the
25th of  January  protest.  Canadian-Egyptian  writer  and  university  professor  May
Telmissany has a similar story, recounting how ‘after the revolution, I wanted to go
back home and participate in the struggle against the dictatorship.’4 Or Mohamed, for
example,  who has  been living in  France  since  2000.  Having initially  contributed to
organizing the mobilization in France, he decided on 9 February to return to Egypt so
that he could go to Tahrir square, but in the end he remained only 1 month.5 These
sorts  of  cases  often involve dual  nationals  residing in the West.6 Unlike in Tunisia,
where many French-Tunisians participated in postrevolutionary governments,  these
dual citizens were not offered similar positions in Egypt. However, like in Tunisia, they
were often seen as foreigners: May Telmissany recounts how during the protests people
spoke to her in English and were very surprised when she replied to them in Arabic
that she is Egyptian.
8 Emigrant return is at the heart of the 2014 Ramadan television series Ambrâturiyat Mîn
(Whose Empire?).7 The series depicts the return of Amira, a British-Egyptian who, full of
hope and ambitions to  contribute to  the emergence of  a  new Egypt,  convinces her
family to leave their beautiful villa in London in order to return to Cairo and take part
in the revolution. The series plays off the interweaving of the heroine’s personal story
—a sequence of disillusionments and frustrations—with postrevolutionary events. From
the moment she boards the plane, Amira realizes that her vision of the Egypt she left
long ago no longer corresponds with the Egypt of 2011. Her good intentions and quest
for an authentic Egypt that she lost are repeatedly thwarted. The first episode comes to
an end with Amira arriving in Egypt handcuffed at the back of the plane, after she
became exasperated at  the incivilities  she had to suffer during the trip.  This  scene
foreshadows the final episode in which Amira and her family are arrested for foreign
espionage, on the basis of accusations fabricated by the secret service and media. It is
thus indeed the loyalty of bi-nationals that the political powers doubt.
9 Even if most had the intention to return to live in Egypt permanently, their optimism
was short-lived and a significant number went back to their adopted countries.
 
Forced Returns from Libya
10 Several hundred thousand Egyptians returned from Saudi Arabia in 2013, in the context
of  expulsions  of  irregular  migrants  (see  below)  and  an  equally  large  number  were
forced to flee Libya. Libya, which had opened its doors at the beginning of the 1990s,8 at
a time when departures to Iraq were abating because of the Gulf war (Fargues, 2000),
had a large number of Egyptian workers.  These were principally migrants with low
qualifications  from  poor  regions  such  as  Upper  Egypt,  working  in  sectors  like
construction. In 2011, the country slid rapidly toward civil war. Following a Western
intervention in March, Gadhafi fell in October. This sparked the largest migratory crisis
in the region since that of the 1990 Gulf war and prior to the Syrian tragedy, which
would force the exodus of millions of people. Both Libyans and foreign workers arrived
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at  the  country’s  borders,  fleeing  the  fighting.  Their  countries  of  origin  as  well  as
international organizations such as the IOM (International Organization for Migration)
and the HCR (High Commission for Refugees) mobilized to assist in repatriating the
refugees (Abdelfattah, 2011).
11 There were several  distinct  waves of  Egyptians returnees:  in  2011,  several  hundred
thousand returned to Egypt, either directly, or via Tunisia if they lived in western Libya
(Zohry,  2013).9 In  the  summer  of  2014,  after  the  violent  clashes  in  Tripoli,  15,000
Egyptians left the country. The third wave occurred in February 2015, when the official
number  of  Egyptian  migrants  was  estimated to  be  200-250,000  people.10 More  than
50,000 Egyptians returned after the decapitation of 21 Coptic (Christian) Egyptians by IS
(Islamic  State)  whose  killing  was  immediately  publicized  on  social  media.  Egypt
responded with retaliatory air strikes against IS, with help from the Emirates. During
this  period,  other  Egyptians,  many of  whom were Copts,  were kidnapped or  killed,
generally  by  Islamist  militias.  Egyptians  migrants  were  thus  hostages  of  regional
geopolitics  and Copts  constituted a  doubly  symbolic  target,  both as  Christians  in  a
context of sectarian violence, and as Egyptians, in retaliation against their country’s
policies, being doubly accused by their aggressors of supporting the loyalists in the East
of Libya and having ousted the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt in July 2013.
12 Egyptian  authorities  feared  the  impact  of  these  massive  returns  on  an  already
disastrous labour market. The returnees and their families found themselves in such
difficult  conditions that  Egypt  requested  the  World  Food  Programme  put  in  place
assistance programmes in certain governorates in Upper Egypt, which offered food in
exchange for recipients taking professional training programmes.11 The IOM launched
information  platforms  to  assist  in  the  reintegration  of  returnees,  in  particular  by
providing them with access to employment offers and health services.12 Due to this
extreme vulnerability, the poorest migrants fairly quickly returned to Libya, despite
the Egyptian government’s  warnings that its  citizens should not travel  there.  Some
used illegal channels, and several Egyptians were found dead in the desert, abandoned
by smugglers. In early July 2015, dozens of Egyptians were arrested in proximity to the
Salloum border crossing or the Siwa Oasis while trying to enter Libya illegally.13 Despite
the collapse of the Libyan state, the fight against illegal immigration continues: in 2013,
2,000 Egyptians were prevented from returning to Libya after the Eid holidays because
they lacked valid residence visas14 and 360 were expelled directly from the Misrata
airport for holding falsified residency permits.
 
Deferred Returns
13 The current situation in Egypt appears so catastrophic that if they have the possibility
of  doing  so,  many  Egyptians  abroad  are  putting  off  their  return.  Among  migrants
interviewed in the Emirates in 2014 and 2015, the vast majority did not wish to return
at that time. Some even wished to move onward to a Western country, often Canada, in
order to obtain another nationality. This strategy, which existed prior the revolution
but has been bolstered since, allows for minimizing the risks of the revolution. Having a
Western passport offers the educated middle and upper classes the security of much
more flexible international movement than holders of an Egyptian passport alone. Once
they have acquired this passport, some do not hesitate to return to Egypt or the Gulf
with this ace up their sleeve that will allow them to leave again easily. In an American
school  in Maadi,  a  upscale  neighbourhood to the south of  Cairo,  nearly half  of  the
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registered pupils are dual citizens with American passports.15 Canada recently adopted
a new citizenship law that threatens to thwart these projects: the required period of
residency in order to obtain citizenship has been lengthened and a declaration of intent
to reside in the country is  now obligatory,  in order to avoid what the government
refers to as ‘citizenship of convenience.’
 
Departures: Emigration Continues
14 Several polls (IOM, 2011; Zohry, 2013) downplay the impact of the revolution on the
desire to emigrate: those who, after 2011, wished to leave the country generally already
intended to do so prior to that date. However new reasons emerged, such as insecurity
and instability. According to another poll, repeated on several occasions in August 2011
and  December  2014,  the  percentage  of  the  population  wishing  to  emigrate  varied
between  11  and  17%.16 Departures  therefore  continue,  unchecked  by  the  return  to
authoritarianism under General Sisi and his endeavours to restart the economy in a
lasting way.
 
Changes and Continuities in Emigrant Profiles
15 Young men with low levels of qualifications who are not able to find work leave for
other Arab countries or grow the ranks of irregular migrants in Europe. Like in Tunisia,
the collapse of the state in the early months of 2011 provided those wished to do so
with opportunities to leave illegally. A number of unaccompanied minors took their
chances, since they are reputed not to be expelled upon arrival in Europe. Already in
2008,  35% of  irregular  migrants  from Egypt  intercepted  in  Lampedusa17 were  male
unaccompanied minors.18 During Morsi’s presidency, Copts emigrated massively toward
the Coptic diaspora’s traditional destinations: the United States, Canada, Australia, and
Europe.19 Their reasons for departure can be simultaneously economic and political,
even if  some avoid foregrounding the religious  dimension when interviewed.  Some
entrepreneurs have turned away from Egypt to start businesses in the Gulf: for some,
Dubai is a fallback where they establish their families while moving back and forth for
business between the Gulf and Egypt. People belonging to the middle and upper classes
establish themselves in the Gulf or North America due to fear of the internal political
situation and insecurity. After the destitution of president Morsi in July 2013 and the
Rabaa  Al-Adawiya  square  massacre,  leaders  of  the  Muslim  Brotherhood  exiled
themselves  to  Qatar,  Tunisia,  or  Turkey.  After  the  army’s  return  to  power,  a  few
intellectuals (a minority, since the majority support the army) and artists also left. For
example Mohamed Hashem, a revolutionary hostile to the current regime and founder
of  a  large  Egyptian  publishing  house,  Meritt,  announced  on  his  Facebook  page  in
October 2013 that he was leaving Egypt and that he considered emigration the only
possible avenue in the face of the elite’s deafening silence.
16 Thus, the profiles of those who have left Egypt after 2011 can vary according to political
temporalities, without there being any profound break with the prior period.
 
Unchanged Destinations and Reduced Opportunities to Migrate
17 Young Egyptians interviewed in March 2011 preferred five destinations: Saudi Arabia,
the United Arab Emirates, the United States, Kuwait and Italy (IOM, 2011). The absence
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of statistical data in the Gulf prevents us from ascertaining how many Egyptians are
there and whether they are fewer or more numerous since 2011. However fieldwork
suggests increased difficulty in emigrating to the Gulf after 2011. Fearing the spread of
contestation,20 the Gulf countries, in particular Saudi Arabia and the Emirates, both of
which are major destination countries for Egyptians, modified their policies. On the one
hand,  they  reinforced  security  checks  on  migratory  flows  coming  from  countries
experiencing revolutionary contestation—for example by taking care not to allow in
Egyptians known to be revolutionaries or Islamists (with the exception of Qatar, which
accepted Muslim Brothers)—and on the other, they revived workforce nationalisation
policies and created unemployment allowances so as to avoid generating among their
citizens  the  ‘prerevolutionary’  conditions  of  a  class  of  rebellious  youth  graduates
without employment.
18 In the Emirates, just after Mubarak’s fall, numerous Egyptians’ work permits or existing
employment contracts were not renewed. The fear of revolutionary contagion is not
the only reason for these measures.  It  is  probable that the Egyptian migrants were
pawns in bilateral diplomatic and economic relations between the two countries. This
closure  was  interpreted  by  some  Egyptians  as  an  expression  of  the  Emirates’
dissatisfaction  with  respect  to  the  decision  to  put  Mubarak  on  trial  and  the
rapprochement with Iran,  as  well  as  irritation at  the freezing of  large Emirati  real
estate developments in Cairo’s new cities, which were accused of involving illegality
and corruption for  which several  Egyptian ministers  were imprisoned (Abdelfattah,
2011). Fieldwork conducted in 2014 and 2015 confirmed these persistent difficulties for
Egyptians seeking to renew their residence permits or come to work in the Emirates.
The Emirates  expelled Egyptians belonging to  the Muslim Brotherhood and quickly
sent home Egyptian migrants who expressed support for Bin Laden after his death in
2011.21 However, it is clear that Egyptians continued to establish themselves in Dubai
after the revolution. Since 2013 the two countries have had good relations and have
conducted  joint  military  operations  in  Libya.  The  Emirates  also  support  Egypt
financially.
19 In June 2011, Saudi Arabia modified its immigration control policy, prioritising the
struggle against illegal immigration: several hundred thousand foreign workers were
expelled (Thiollet, 2013; Beaugrand, 2013), and according to the press 300,000 Egyptians
voluntarily  left  the  country  because  they  were  in  irregular  situations.22 In  parallel,
Riyadh launched a policy aimed at the ‘Saudi-ization’ of the workforce. Although these
measures do not directly target Egyptians in the way some have claimed (Abdelfattah,
2011),  they do nevertheless  affect  them insofar  as  Egyptians are  one of  the largest
foreign communities in Saudi Arabia.
20 2011 does not appear to have resulted in major shifts in other countries and regions of
the world (Fargues and Fandrich, 2012), except some that were already underway: in
Jordan, where Egyptians represent 82% of the active foreign male population (Roussel,
2012), the number of work permits decreased by 11% between 2009 and 2010 (Pagès-El
Karoui,  2015),  which  supports  Françoise  de  Bel-Air’s  claim  (2014)  that  the  Arab
revolutions were sparked in a context of reduced migratory opportunities caused by
the economic crisis of 2008 and the renewal of workforce nationalisation policies. In
2009,  seeing  the  level  of  unemployment  increase  and  fearing  a  massive  return  of
emigrants, Egyptian authorities feared an imminent migration crisis (Zohry, 2009). In
the United States, a decrease is also visible between 2009 and 2011 in the attribution of
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permanent resident status, after which the number again increased, starting in 2012
(Figure 1). For naturalizations, the curve is approximately the same (Figure 2).
21 In Europe, on the other hand, according to Eurostat, Egyptian emigration has increased
since 2007: by 19% in Germany, 22% in the UK, 45% in Spain and 58% in Italy.  The
number of residency permits has been increasing constantly since 2008: in 2013, nearly
200,000 Egyptians were official residents in Europe, of which 135,000 in Italy. However
in Italy the number of first-time residency permits issued has considerably decreased:
12,855 were issued in 2011,  compared to 20,532 in 2010.  Italy,  which is  facing very
strong migratory pressure, increasing since the Arab revolutions, has perhaps chosen
to  be  stricter  toward  new  arrivals,  while  at  the  same  time  allowing  the  already
established Egyptian community to renew its residency permits.
 
Figure 1: Number of Egyptians Obtaining Permanent Residency Status in the United States
Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security.
 
Figure 2: Naturalisations of Egyptians in the United States
Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security.
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Revolution as a Determinant of Migratory Trajectories?
22 In some cases, the revolution played a determinant role in departure. Thus, Medhat,
who ran two tourism and consulting companies in Egypt, left his country just after the
revolution, in March 2011: 
‘After the revolution, I saw that Egypt was descending in chaos [fawda]. I had no income for
two  months,  either  in  consulting  or  tourism.  I  lost  my  contracts  in  Egypt  and
Libya’ (Medhat, Dubai, 2015).
23 He initially left, alone, to England, where his in-laws were well-established. He opened
an apartment rental company focusing on tourists from the Gulf, but with the crisis
only managed to get by. He then decided to establish himself in Dubai where he had a
job offer, and his family joined him there. After working in several companies, at the
beginning of 2015 he opened his own business, a branch of an Asian tourism company.
He explains that he made this decision when he understood that he would not be able
to return to Cairo for several years, having seen the impact of the wars in Libya, Syria
and Yemen, and the effects of Daesh.
24 For Rania, a single engineer in her thirties who lived alone in Dubai between 2012 and
2014, expatriation had nothing to do with the revolution, but was closely linked to her
personal history. She left following a breakup, but was not satisfied by the lifestyle in
Dubai, which she considered superficial. After a year, she took the decision to come
back to Egypt. Interviewed in Cairo in January 2015, she was contemplating returning
to Dubai:
‘In Cairo, after the revolution, you move around less, you prefer to stay at home. We see each
other less. My friends don’t feel safe enough to see each other anymore, and social life is less
full. […] I say the same thing to those who want to come back for family. Stay there, you
don’t see one another that much anyway.’ ((Rania, Le Caire, January 2015)
25 This question of insecurity is often present in the discourse of migrants, for whom it is
sometimes a reason for leaving.23
 
The Consequences of the Arab Revolutions on Migratory Policies
26 Except for the right to vote accorded to Egyptians abroad in 2011, Egyptian policies
related to emigration were not significantly changed by the revolution.24 The issue has
not  been  a  priority  for  the  ruling  powers.  Under  president  Morsi,  the  Muslim
Brotherhood’s objective was to favour circulatory migrations, generally in the direction
of Arab countries, and there was concern about competition from Asian workers in the
Gulf (Hafez and Ghaly, 2012). The revolutions did however have an impact on migratory
policies in the Gulf countries, as we have just seen, as well as those in Europe. While
Libya  has  become  the  principal  point  of  departure  for  boats  trying  to  cross  the
Mediterranean, many of which have tragically sunk since 2015, boats also leave from
the Egyptian coast, in places like Alexandria, Rosetta, or Damietta. The European Union
began  discussions  with  Egypt  and  Tunisia,  in  the  hope of  involving  them  more  in
surveillance of the Libyan coast and rescue of migrants. Europe’s increasing efforts to
externalize its migratory policies toward the southern margins are one of the major
impacts of the Arab revolutions on the Mediterranean migratory system. But this is not
really a novelty.
27 While it is complicated to establish a balance sheet with respect to the impact of the
Arab revolutions on flows of Egyptians, since departures and returns are both difficult
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to  quantify  and  work  in  both  directions,  offsetting  one  another,  the  impact  on
expatriate communities is more legible, though its analysis still requires attention to
different temporalities and highly changing political contexts.
 
The Repercussions of the Revolution on Egyptians
Abroad
28 Initially, the revolutionary process corresponded to an intensification of transnational
practices for many Egyptians living abroad: renewed interest and reinforced ties with
Egypt  (increased  remittances,  real  or  virtual  contact  on  social  media,  political
mobilization, etc), and the emergence of new transnational practices, such as overseas
voting or protests in countries of residence. Often discreet and relatively unknown in
their countries of residence, Egyptians acquired a new visibility, insofar as they began
to group together and mobilize. Can we go further and see these events as contributing
to the construction of an emergent diaspora? This is very unclear since although the
aftermath  of  the  25  January  revolution  has  been  interpreted  as  a  moment  when
Egyptians abroad,  who were very little  organized,  began to meet,  overcoming their




Renewed Pride in being Egyptian
29 Among Egyptians abroad, the 25 January revolution, referred to as the ‘revolution of
dignity,’ renewed a feeling of deep attachment to the home country, combined with
new feelings of pride and shared destiny. After Mubarak’s fall, emigrants seized on the
imaginary  of  a  new Egypt  forged during  the  18  days  on Tahrir  Square,  which had
become  a  revolutionary  icon.  This  utopian  moment  during  which  Egyptian  society
dreamed of itself as united and capable of overcoming all of its divisions allowed for a
reinvention of  the  national  narrative  (Pagès-El  Karoui,  2014)  and strengthened ties
between emigrants and their country of origin, including among the second generation
(Premazzi, Ambrosetti, Ceka, Fokkema, 2013; Soudy, 2013). Thus, Ahmed, an Egyptian-
American living in Washington stated:
30 Because it was something to be proud of, Egyptians were doing something historic […].
How could you not feel proud? If ordinary non-Arab, non-Egyptian people were looking
at Egypt with a huge sense of pride and inspiration, how could I as an Egyptian not feel
that  pride? And  in  my  mind,  I  had  always  felt  that  Egyptian  nationalism,  modern
nationalism, is so shallow, because it is mostly chauvinism, it is mostly about 7000 years
of history, and the Pharaohs, etc. […] Suddenly, there was something to be proud of.
(Soudy, 2013: 139)
31 This  reactivation  of  national  pride  may  have  driven  returns,  as  some  emigrants
fervently wished to participate in the democratic transition.  For those who did not
return,  the  Egyptian  flag  became  a  marker  of  identity:  displayed  in  cars  and
apartments, it attested to this patriotic pride.
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Transnational Political Engagement
32 How did Egyptians abroad experience the revolutionary process? Interviewees indicate
that they spent large amounts of time in front of the television and on social media.
Thanks to internet, emigrants could follow the unfolding events and communicate with
protesters. An analysis of more than 3 million tweets containing six keywords (hash
tags) connected to the Arab revolts (such as #egypt or #sidibouzid, for example) showed
that a very large number of messages were posted and shared by expatriates (Zhuo,
Wellmann and Yu, 2011). In general, many concerned expatriates participated in street
protests  organized  in  Western countries  and became very  involved  in  processes  of
transnational politicization (Müller-Funk, 2014).25 However, Simona Ricci (2013) shows
that many only followed the events on Facebook. Thus, an Egyptian activist living in
Paris lamented that the majority of his fellow Egyptian citizens belong to the ‘couch
potato party,’ a very evocative expression.
33 Egyptians abroad remember the 18 days as a moment of intensity that sometimes up-
ended their social lives: new friendships were formed, couples got together or broke
up,  people  came  together  as  flat  mates,  migratory  trajectories  were  modified.  For
Mohamed, who came to France in 2000 and had relatively few connections to Egyptians
in Paris, involvement on the 25th of January in the first gathering26 at Châtelet, was a
moment of reconnection with his fellow citizens.27 While Tahrir was becoming a new
forum  for  citizenship,  political  debates  abroad  grew  on  social  media.  In  France,
numerous associations were created in the wake of the revolution (the Committee for
Solidarity with the Struggle of the Egyptian People, the Association of 25th of January
Youth,  the  Tahrir  Square  Movement,  etc).  The  United  States  experienced a  similar
phenomenon: the Egyptian American Rule of Law Association (EARLA) invested itself in
the promotion of the rule of law in Egypt; the American-Egyptian Strategic Alliance
(AESA) aimed to influence political relations between the United States and Egypt in
order  to  encourage  security,  stability  and mutual  prosperity  in  both countries  and
promote democratic values; a group of entrepreneurs launched NEGMA (Networking,
Entrepreneurship, Growth, Mobilization, & Action) at a conference in March 2012 at
MIT  (Massachusetts  Institute  of  Technology),  with  the  goal  of  connecting  Egyptian
businessmen with their expatriate counterparts (Soudy, 2013). It is worth noting that
after  an  initial  period  of  revolutionary  enthusiasm,  a  number  of  these  initiatives
declined or disappeared.
34 In reality, only a minority of emigrants became seriously engaged in the revolutionary
process, either by returning to Egypt or through activism in their host countries. The
vast majority of emigrants were content to remain attentive and passionate spectators
of the changes that were underway. It is still too soon to evaluate in a more precise way
the involvement of Egyptians living abroad in sparking the revolution, but this appears
to have been important, alongside the development of transnational political networks
of Egyptian activists (Abdelrahman, 2011). During interviews I was able to carry out in
Cairo in September 2011 among migrants who had returned from France, all indicated
that they had participated in the Tahrir square protests and underscored that a large
proportion of the protesters had had experiences abroad.
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Revolution as an Accelerator of “Diasporization”28?
35 It is difficult to speak about an Egyptian diaspora in the strict sense of the term since
the ‘communities’ abroad are very fragmented and little structured, with the exception
of  Copts  (Pagès-El  Karoui,  2012b;  Severo  and Zuolo,  2012).  At  the  beginning  of  the
revolutionary  process,  it  was  possible  to  think that  the  unfolding political  changes
might allow for a process of disasporization around common national references. Just
before 2011, Mohamed El Baradei, former Director General of the International Atomic
Energy Agency and Nobel Peace Prize winner, became an iconic figure for Egyptians
abroad. He positioned himself as an alternative candidate to Mubarak in the future
presidential elections, and a defender of the rights of emigrants: one of the leading
measures of his National Assembly for Change was the right to vote for Egyptians abroad
(see  below).  In  2010  he  managed  to  mobilize  many  Egyptians  during  speeches  in
London, Washington, New York, and Boston.
36 After Mubarak’s fall, the feeling that there was a connection between Egyptians abroad
was predominant, from the United States to Qatar (Soudy, 2013). In France, the idea of
‘forming a community’ began to take root, whereas in interview conducted prior to
2011 the adage ‘beware of the Egyptians abroad’ was predominant. The same feeling of
‘being one’ through the erasure of differences that predominated during the 18 days on
Tahrir square animated Egyptians in France. New and previously unseen encounters
occurred  between  Egyptians  from  different  worlds,  such  as  the  sans-papiers of  the
construction industry and highly educated students or executives. Common belonging
was accentuated, even if social, political or gendered tensions stubbornly remained: a
young woman from the Egyptian bourgeoisie was slapped twice by a vegetable seller
whom she asked to drop ‘death to Jews’ from the slogans he was shouting.29 Belief in
the myth of national unity existed,  but with less conviction than on Tahrir square.
There  are  several  reasons  for  this.  First,  in  Egypt,  the  fear  of  repression  fed  this
collective imaginary; in France, such fear was much weaker, even if for the sans-papiers,
protesting  involved  risk  of  arrest.  In  addition,  the  places  where  support  for  the
revolutionary process was expressed were from the outset multiple (as in Egypt): the
Fontaine  des  Innocents  at  Châtelet,  following  in  the  footsteps  of  the  Tunisian
movement  which  had  already  gathered  there;  Place  du  Trocadéro;  the  Egyptian
Embassy (occupied for several days); Belleville, etc. Nowhere acquired the status of an
iconic public space the way Tahrir square did, symbolically embodying the myth of
unity.
37 These  tensions  were  visible  from  the  outset.  For  example  there  were  competing
protests that departed from different locations on the same day. Another example of
tension  occurred  in  a  French-Egyptian  association  created  to  support  the  Egyptian
revolution, where Egyptian activists rejected the involvement of French people who
had lived in Egypt, considering this a kind of spoliation: ‘It’s our revolution. They’re
stealing it from us’.30 The dream of unity soon splintered, the revolutionary passion
transforming itself into ‘micromovements’31 and associations tearing themselves apart
and dividing around two or three members, in personality conflicts (Ricci, 2013). These
cleavages  were  deepened  after  president  Morsi’s  destitution,  as  the  tensions of
Egyptian society were exported abroad. In Paris,  incidents between those who were
pro-Muslim Brotherhood and the rest increased, leading to the closure of the Egyptian
cultural centre on boulevard Saint Michel. During a talk at the Institut du Monde Arabe
(IMA) in October 2013, the Egyptian novelist Alaa Al-Aswany was so violently taken to
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task by Morsi partisans that security had to evacuate him from the conference room.
While the desire to organize around a common belonging to the Egyptian nation that
was temporarily experimented with during the early moments of enthusiasm has been
lost, one new transnational political practice has, however, emerged: overseas voting.
 
Voting Rights for Egyptians Abroad: A Postrevolutionary Innovation
38 The renewal of studies on overseas voting around the world and in Arab countries in
particular (Lafleur, 2013; Collyer, 2014; Jaulin, 2014) is slowly being extended to Egypt
(El Baradei, 2012; Brand, 2013).32 Yet, this innovation is one of the strongest symbols of
the political transition and reflects a new imaginary concerning the equality of citizens,
even if foreign voting is not necessarily an indication of democracy and president Sisi’s
election  abruptly  arrested  the  transition  process.  Nevertheless,  this  new  right  for
expatriates attests to the enlargement of the boundaries of Egyptian citizenship and
the assertiveness of Egyptian civil society, outside the country as much as inside it, who
fought hard to obtain it.
 
The Traditional Mistrust toward Egyptians Abroad
39 The  authorities  have  always  been  strongly  suspicious  of  the  loyalty  of  Egyptians
abroad,  even  if  their  degrees  of  suspicion  varied  slightly  after  2011  depending  on
whether the Islamists or the military was in power. In the constitutional declaration of
2011, promulgated by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, article 26 made the
conditions of eligibility to the post of President stricter in terms of nationality: ‘It is
required for whoever is elected president of the republic to be an Egyptian who has
never held another citizenship,  born of  two Egyptian parents who have never held
another citizenship, enjoying his/her political and civil rights, not married to a non-
Egyptian,  and  not  falling  under  the  age  of  40  years.’33 Hazem  Salah  Abu-Ismael,  a
Salafist candidate espousing violently anti-American rhetoric, ended up being excluded
on the basis of this provision since his mother, who was by then dead, had held an
American  passport.  The  president  of  the  committee  in  charge  of  revising  the
constitution justified the criteria by explaining that they were the ones used in military
academies and should therefore apply to presidential candidates (Soliman, 2011).
40 This nationalistic (and military) vision of citizenship appears completely unsuited to
the migratory reality of contemporary Egypt. It is doubly exclusive since it rules out of
the national narrative both Egyptians of foreign origin, though they are entirely a part
of  it,  as  well  as  Egyptians  living  abroad,  as  though  leaving  the  national  territory
inexorably leads to the erosion of national sentiment. This position is criticized by the
political  scientist  Samer  Soliman,  who  is  in  favour  of  the  integration  of  Egyptians
abroad, recalling in his argument the extent to which the development of China and
Israel rests largely on the skills of expatriate and bi-national communities:
‘The “conspiracy” against Egyptians abroad continues. Frankly speaking, sidelining
Egyptians living abroad is not because of doubts about their patriotism but because
of their potential. They are “suspected” of being competent and therefore pose a
threat to the quasi-talented in government positions. They are also “suspected” of
not succumbing to the authorities or being guided to vote in a certain way because
their living standards are high and they are beyond the reach of the state security
agency that continues its operations under other names’ (Hafez and Khaly, 2012:
17).
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41 The new Egyptian Constitution adopted in December 2012 under Morsi’s presidency
eliminated  the  requirement  that  the  candidate’s  parents  never  have  held  dual
citizenship, however the president himself still could not hold dual citizenship or be
married  to  a  non-Egyptian.  The  economic  contribution  of  emigrants  to  the
development of their country is, on the other hand, strongly encouraged. Ultimately,
the  last  Constitution,  adopted  in  2014  after  Morsi’s  destitution,  returned  to  the
narrower view, allowing neither the candidate, his parents, nor his spouse to have held
any other nationality.
 
The Mobilization of Egyptians Abroad to Obtain the Right to Vote
42 In  October 2011,  the administrative  court  confirmed the right  to  vote  from abroad
following two cases, of which one was brought by Egyptians living abroad, including
the famous novelist Ahdaf Soueif, with support from the Hisham Mubarak Law Centre.
This mobilization was orchestrated over social media and Twitter in particular (with
the  hashtags  #EgyAbroad  and #right2vote),  in  order  to  coordinate  actions  between
Egyptians across various countries of residence. In October 2011, several protests were
organized simultaneously in front of consulates and embassies in London, Washington,
New York and Paris.34 This new right was acquired by means of intense mobilizations of
Egyptian citizens,  abroad and in Egypt alike,  and it  modified the relations between
Egyptians  and  the  institutions  representing  them  abroad.  They  overcame  their
traditional suspicion of their embassy and consulate and registered themselves in large
numbers at embassies, hoping to soon have the possibility of voting.35
 
First Elections
43 In the 2011-2012 legislative elections, Egyptians abroad were able to vote for the first
time:  355,500 voters were registered in 163 different countries,  of  which 142,700 in
Saudi Arabia. Unlike in Tunisia, they did not have separate representatives: their votes
were counted in their place of last residence before leaving Egypt. For the presidential
elections  of  2012,  the  official  Egyptian  elections  website36 indicates  that  of  586,803
registered voters, 311,875 cast ballots in the first round. These voter figures appear low
in light of the millions of Egyptians who live abroad, but it must be recalled that low
turnout is recurrent in overseas voting and that in fact, participation rates were higher
abroad  than  inside  Egypt:  53.6%  compared  to  47%  in  the  first  round,  whereas  the
turnout  rates  converge  around  52%  for  the  second  round  (see  tables  1  and  2).  In
addition, significant constraints limited the exercise of this right: first, not everyone is
in  possession  of  a  national  identity  card,  which  was  required  to  vote,  and  second,
polling stations were limited to embassies and a few consulates, so many voters may
not have made the trip when the distance was too great. Finally, voters had to present
their residency permit, which deprived anyone in an irregular situation of the right to
vote.
 
Table 1: 2012 Presidential Election (Round 1)37
 Votes cast Participation rate Islamist Ancien regime Left
Egyptians abroad 311,875 53.6% 62.7% 21.3% 15.9%
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Egypt total 27,153,030 47% 43.3% 35% 21.5%
Source: High Elections Committee. URL: http://pres2012.elections.eg/index.php/round1-results
 
Table 2: 2012 Presidential Election (Round 2)
 Votes cast Participation rate Morsi Shafiq
Egyptians abroad 301,720 53.3% 74.9% 25.1%
Egypt total 25,577,511 52% 51.7% 48.3%
Source: High Elections Committee. URL: http://pres2012.elections.eg/index.php/round2-results
44 Emigrants’ enthusiasm for their new right resulted in long queues at embassies and
consulates around the world, especially in the Gulf countries, which host the largest
Egyptian  communities.  As  protests  are  prohibited  there,  expatriates  were  not  able,
prior to that time, to publicly express their participation in the extraordinary changes
their  country  was  undergoing.  This  resulted  in  a  truly  novel  situation,  whereby
Egyptians  gave  a  public  lesson  in  democracy  to  the  Gulf  countries  that  feared
revolutionary ‘contagion.’  Among the forty Egyptians interviewed in Dubai, the vast
majority participated in the elections, and only a few women declared that they had
not voted and had not gotten interested in politics. However several people admitted to
having abstained in round 2 of the presidential election, which was a runoff between
the Muslim Brotherhood candidate  Morsi,  and the candidate  of  the former regime,
Shafiq.38 The effect of  these abstentions is  visible in the decrease of  the number of
ballots cast (see Table 2).
45 What were the results of the vote?39 Did emigrants vote differently than their fellow
citizens?  The  generally  accepted  hypothesis  is  that  emigrants  living  in  Western
countries would have a tendency to be more liberal than those living in the Gulf, who
would  be  more  conservative  (Fargues,  2011).  The  Tunisian  case  offers  a  counter-
example:  diaspora  voters  caused  surprise,  since  the  Islamists  achieved  equivalent
scores among voters at home and abroad, even though the majority of overseas voters
live in Western countries, in particular France.40 In the Egyptian case the hypothesis
seems to hold, since the Islamist vote is more significant among voters abroad than
inside Egypt, and Egyptians in the Gulf and above all Saudi Arabia constitute the vast
majority of overseas voters (cf. Map 1).41 But the situation varies from one country to
another.  The ‘Islamist’  vote was highest  in Saudi  Arabia,  Bahrain,  Qatar and Oman,
whereas in the Emirates and Kuwait they had less success, potentially introducing a
nuance in our understanding of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), which is too often
considered to be a homogeneous regional entity. Partisans of the old regime were more
numerous  in  Greece,  the  Netherlands,  Australia  and  the  United  States.  In  these
countries, the presence of many Copts, who feared an Islamist victory, undoubtedly had
an impact on the results.
46 In round 2, this tendency was confirmed: Egyptians abroad voted 74.9% for Morsi, a
level of support achieved in very few governorates inside Egypt (except bastions of
Muslim Brotherhood support, such as Fayoum), and the average was 51.7%. In Saudi
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Arabia, the Muslim Brotherhood paid poor immigrants and transported them in buses
to polling stations,  according to two interviewees,  a  sign that common practices of
fraud and clientelism persist.42
 
Map 1: Egyptian overseas voting (Round 1 of the 2012 presidential election)
Source: Compilation of results published in the press. URL: http://egyptianchronicles. blogspot.fr/
2012/05/egyelections-egyptian-expats-vote-round.html
 
Emigrants’ Increased Financial Contribution
47 Savings transfers by emigrants reached 20 billion US dollars in 2014 and represent 7%
of Egypt’s GDP, which receives the most remittances of any Arab country and is 6th
globally.  Graph 1  shows a  sharp  increase  in  remittances  after  2011.  This  source  of
income has become three times larger than revenues generated by the Suez Canal. We
can observe irregular fluctuations in the 1970s and 1980s, stagnation in the 1990s, after
the  Gulf  war  caused  many  Egyptians  to  return  home,  and  finally  a  sharp  increase
beginning in 2004. The rate of increase is slowed by two events: in 2009, the economic
crisis of 2008, and in 2013, the return of 300,000 migrants from Saudi Arabia as a result
of policies against illegal immigration.
48 While the increase had begun prior to 2011, the revolution clearly played a crucial role:
the return of  certain migrants (Libya,  Saudi Arabia)  who brought money back with
them may have temporarily caused figures to bloat. While these returns then resulted
in a decrease in remittances, this was compensated by other departures, while those
remaining abroad maintained their  levels  of  solidarity with relatives in Egypt,  who
have been hard-hit by the steadily worsening economic crisis since 2011. This income is
especially welcome at a time when Egypt is in dire need of foreign currency. Should
these  increases  be  seen as  a  sign that  the  many initiatives  to  channel  remittances
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succeeded?43 Several associations of Egyptians living abroad organized campaigns of
this kind: the Egyptian American Cultural Association (EACA) launched a call for funds
to support the families of martyrs (Soudy, 2013). In the Emirates, Banque Misr offered
free money transfers for two months. The Central Bank of Egypt opened an account
into which Egyptians abroad could deposit money to support the stock exchange and
improve government exchange reserves (Abdelfattah, 2011). Policy on this point did
not subsequently deviate under Morsi,  as the video that he produced in English for
Egyptians working abroad attests.44 Since then, Sisi has continued to move in the same
direction: when he launched the new Suez Canal project, he called on all Egyptians and






49 The  balance  sheet  of  the  Arab  spring  with  respect  to  Egyptian  migrations  is  very
complex to establish because we do not have reliable statistics for the Gulf countries,
which  are  the  main  pole  to  which  Egyptians  are  attracted,  and  because  it  varies
according to different temporalities (for example, the exodus of Muslim Brothers in the
fall of 2013, following Morsi’s destitution), social groups (proportionally, the tendency
to  leave  is  more  pronounced  among  Copts)  and  the  destination  countries.  The
migratory field was not really destabilized by the revolution, even if new barriers arose
for  certain  destinations,  because  of  the  geopolitical  situation  in  Libya  or  the  new
governmental policies put in place in the Gulf to address the fear that contestation
might spread. While 2011 undeniably opened a new cycle in the history of Egyptian
migrations, the overall impact has been much weaker than in Syria, where waves of
refugees have generated a humanitarian crisis, above all in the Middle East, and to a
lesser degree in Europe. The return to authoritarianism and the significantly degraded
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economic situation will continue to feed into departures from Egypt, particularly since
the country is increasingly locked in a cycle of violence, with a nearly insurrectional
situation in Sinai and generalized instability, lending increased importance to security
problems.
50 The post-2011 moment corresponds to a new period for Egyptian emigration, resulting
in  the  intensification  of  transnational  practices,  an  interrupted  process  of
‘diasporization’  and more generally  by increased visibility  of  Egyptian communities
abroad. The strength of transnational connections reactivated ties between migrants or
their descendants and their country of origin. Emigration therefore does not signify the
disappearance of all loyalty, to borrow Hirschman’s (1970) term, toward the country of
origin. Rather, the moral obligation to participate in one’s country’s development was a
driver of many returns in the early moments after the revolution and appears to have
resulted in an increase in remittances. Granting of the right to vote to emigrants attests
to this enlarged national imaginary, and is a move in the direction of greater equality
between citizens.
51 Contrary to many other countries of the region that have witnessed a collapse of the
state, the crumbling of national identity in favour of more primary identifications, the
Egyptian  national  narrative  appears  to  have  come  out  of  the  crisis  strengthened.
Indeed it is a burst of nationalism that allowed the return to authoritarianism. The
national imaginary that was reinvigorated by the spirit of Tahrir but which today is
carried forward by only a few activists, remains crosscut by profound contradictions.
The  nationalist  option  has  been  adopted  by  the  vast  majority  of  Egyptians,  who
consider it to be the only defense against the disasters that have prevailed across the
Middle East.
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ABSTRACTS
This paper examines the impacts of the Arab revolutions on Egyptian emigration, attending to
the diverse temporalities of political life in the country and the region between 2011 and 2015.
New flows, new reasons for migration (instability, insecurity), and new transnational practices
(overseas  voting)  have  arisen.  During  the  postrevolutionary  period,  transnational  practices
gained momentum, a diaspora began to emerge (though this process was soon cut short), and
Egyptian  communities  abroad  became  more  visible.  Transnational  connections  between
Egyptians  as  well  as  migrants’  or  their  descendants’  links  with  Egypt  were  strengthened.
Emigration doesn’t mean an exit which makes all sense of loyalty disappear: the moral obligation
to participate in their country’s development fuelled the return of many migrants in the early
days of the revolution. Nevertheless, the field of Egyptian migration has not been completely
reconfigured by the Arab revolutions.
Cet  article  examine  l’impact  des  révolutions  arabes  sur  l’émigration  égyptienne,  selon  les
temporalités  qui  ont  scandé la  vie  politique entre  2011 et  2015.  Pendant  cette  période,  sont
apparus  de  nouveaux  flux,  motifs  d’émigration  (instabilité,  insécurité)  et  pratiques
transnationales  (vote  à  distance).  Le  moment  post-révolutionnaire  s’est  traduit  par
l’intensification  des  pratiques  transnationales,  par  l’émergence  ponctuelle  d’un  processus  de
diasporisation et,  plus globalement, par une visibilité accrue des communautés égyptiennes à
l’étranger.  La  force  des  connexions  transnationales  a  réactivé  les  liens  qu’entretenaient  les
migrants ou leurs descendants avec l’Égypte. L’émigration n’équivaut pas à une défection qui
ferait disparaître toute loyauté: l’obligation morale de participer au développement de son pays a
été le moteur de nombreux retours dans les premiers temps. Pour autant, le champ migratoire
égyptien n’a pas été entièrement bouleversé par les révolutions arabes.
Este artículo examina el impacto de las revoluciones árabes en la emigración egipcia, según las
temporalidades que han determinado el ritmo de la vida política entre 2011 y 2015. Durante este
periodo  han  aparecido  nuevos  flujos,  motivos  de  emigración  (inestabilidad,  inseguridad)  y
prácticas transnacionales (voto a distancia). El momento post-revolucionario se ha traducido en
una intensificación de las prácticas transnacionales,  a partir de la emergencia puntual de un
proceso de diáspora y, de forma más global, a partir de una mayor visibilidad de las comunidades
egipcias en el extranjero. La fuerza de las conexiones transnacionales ha reactivado los vínculos
que mantenían los migrantes o sus descendientes con Egipto. La emigración no equivale a una
deserción susceptible  de  hacer  desaparecer  toda lealtad:  la  obligación moral  de  participar  al
desarrollo del país fue el motor de numerosos retornos durante una primera etapa. A pesar de
The Arab Spring: A Revolution for Egyptian Emigration?
Revue européenne des migrations internationales, vol. 31 - n°3 et 4 | 2015
22
ello, el campo migratorio egipcio no ha sido completamente transformado por las revoluciones
árabes.
INDEX
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